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Dialogal Phenomenology and the Pursuit of Political Reality 
STUART C. GILMAN 
University af Richmond 
I leave methods to the botanists and the mathematicians. There 
is a point at which methods devour themselves. 
FRANTZ FANON 
Perry relates that on his polar h·ip he travel ed one whole day 
toward the North , making his sleigh dogs run briskly. At night 
he checked his bearings to determine his latitude and noticed 
with great surprise that he was much further South than in the 
morning. He ,bad been toiling all day toward the North on an 
immense iceberg drawn southward by an ocean current. 
JOSE ORTEGA y GASSET 
The purpose of this reseai-ch is to uncov er some of the major prob-
lems in the ethics of measurement and fact in the social sciences. And, 
subsequently, to propose some answers. What th e next several pages 
attempt to develop is a pathology of methodology in political science. 
While this body is '1ying" open , we will atte mpt to expose the founda-
tions of ph enomenological research and methods. Again, it must be 
stressed that this piece is concerned only with methodological questions. 
By necessity, this demarcation line will be viola,ted at times to deal with 
cruicial epistemological qu estions; but only as they pertain to metho-
dology. A number of these paradigmatic and, to some degree, epistemol-
logical questions, have been dealt with by Professor Hwa Yol Jung. 1 
Specifically, the pap er will begin by looking at the underpinnings , and 
subsequent dilemmas, of methodology in behavioralism. Once this "au-
topsy " is completed a comparison between the empiricism of behavior-
alism and the radical empiricism of phenomenology will be developed. 
1 See especially Hwa Yol Jung "A Critique of the Behavioral Presuasion in 
Politics: A Phenomenological View" in Mauri ce Natanson, ed., Phenomenology and 
the Social Sciences (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), II, pp. 
133-73; "The Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology," The Review of 
Politics (Vol. 33, o. 4, October, 1971), pp. 538-563; and '"The Crisis of Political 
Understanding: An Insight Into Subjectivity in Political Inquiry" unpublished manu-
script, Caucus for a New Political Science Panel, A.P.S.A. Meeting, Chicago, 1974. 
I am deeply indebted to Professor Jung for providing these and other manuscripts 
for my research. 
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This will allow us to uncover the foundations for the use of dialogal 
phenomenology ,and to prescribe some of its applications in political 
science. 
Our purpose is not to retrace the more than adequate critiques of 
behavioralism because of its liberal ( Theodore Lowi, The End of Liber-
alism) , pluralistic ( William Connolly, The Bias of Pluralism), ideologi-
cal ( Stanislav Andreski, Social Science as Sorcery), ,and symbolic ( Murry 
Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action) biases. Here the purpose is to 
show how these biases are reflected in methodological considerations 
in behavioralism. Behavioralism is being used in its paradigmatic sense, 2 
and for om· purposes, this also includes most of the recent post-behavioral 
work. Contrary to possible protestations from post-behavioral theorists, 
little , if nothing, has been done to change the methodologies employed 
in their research. They have just succeeded in building one more floor 
on the same tower of Babel. 
Behavioralism, like all philosophies and scientific inquiries, per-
ceives the development of methodology as one of the essential require-
ments for research. However , methodology is not synonymous with 
statistics. Statis,tics is a method. This is a distinction recognized by a 
number of scholars. 3 Methodology is the precursor of analysis of which 
statistics can be a part. For social science the unquestioned benefit of 
the behavioral movements has been the attention given to objective or 
open methodology. The history of the development of social scientific 
methodologies has pointed to the difficulties encountered in this area. 4 
What methodology allows is a program, sometimes detail ed and explicit 
and other times assumptive and implicit, on how <research is to be done. 
In other words, methodology characterizes, refines and defines the re-
search question. The element which dominates social scientific metho-
dologies is the assumption that an individual has the cognitive ability 
to know what the right question, the right method is. 
Methodology can thus be conceived as the study of ontology. This 
is a radical departure from contemporary views on this subject. ( In fact, 
2 Paradigm is being defined in Thomas Kuhn's sense (The Structure af Scientific 
Revolutions ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 10): 
"They [paradigms] were able to do so because they shared two essential 
characteristics . Their achievement was sufficiently unpreced ented to attract an 
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. 
Simultaneously, it was sufficiently openended to leave all sorts of problems for 
the redefined group of practitioners to resolve." 
a Michael Haas and Henry Kmiel, Approaches to the Study af Political Science 
(Scranton , Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970) pp. 30-32. Also see Kaplan: pp. 
18-19. 
4 cf. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Pub-
lishing Co., 1964). 
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a colleague mentioned that this was as taboo as calling philosophy of 
science a modern, philosophy of natur e). Perhaps by leaving methodol-
ogy as sacrosanctly "scientific'' instead of ontological, the social sciences 
have simply left themselves open ,to naive stands on ethical neutrality. 
Some of those who believe that science is or should be ethically neu-
tral have fallen squarely into the naturalistic fallacy by their very 
eff:fforts to avoid it. Insisting that they only describe and not pre-
scribe, they deny that any consideration of right or wrong applies to 
their subject matter. Yet, in the social sciences, above ,all, what is 
described often does have an ethical aspect. From that point of view 
the "objective" scientist runs into some danger of condoning what is 
wrong or rejecting what is right. Or, at least , his attempted with-
holding of judgment may in itself amount to an ethical judgment. 5 
In this same sense the social sciences are not "doing" science, but in 
Hugh Stretton's sense engineering. 6 The distinction is simply lost in the 
shuffle of inquiry. 
Let us make the heretical leap and at least for the time being accept 
methodology as an extention of ontology, in order to gain ,the necessary 
perspective on our subject. Ellen Wood argues that Kant had to do the 
same thing in order to develop what she calls his "dialectical empiri-
cism." "His attack on the empiricists , therefore, is not simply an episte-
mological quibble, but a far-rearching argument about the nature of 
human freedom." 7 In so doing Kant made a critical break with the 
philosophers who preceeded him. Contrary to possible appearances, 
a-theoretical social science is not being advocated. Simply, distinctions 
are being drawn betwe en epistemology and ontology. Our emphasis is 
from ,an ontological point of view, and nothing in this article should 
be construed as advocating a doing away with theory. Quite to the con-
5 C. G. Simpson, "Naturalistic Ethics and the Social Sciences" quoted in Theo-
dore C. Kahn, An Introduction to Hominology ( Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas 
Publishers, 1969), p. 53 . 
6 Hugh Stretton, Th e Political Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), p. 159. "'Scienti£c' can mean an organizing preference for more general 
over more local knowledge; 'engineering' repr esents every sort of political, social 
or enterprising purpose, and the organization of research to serve such purposes 
directly." 
7 Ellen Wood , Mind and Politics (Berkeley: University of Callfornia Press, 
1972) , p. 29. For Kant, paradigmatic shifts require shifts in "being." It appears that 
Carl Kordig was right when he, in effect, chastized Thomas Kuhn (Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions) for not going far enough. See Carl Kordig, "The Theory 
Ladenn ess of Observation," The Review of Metaphysics ( XXIV, March, 1971), p. 
448. Cf. Alasdair Macintyre, "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the 
Philo sophy of Science," MONIST, Vol. 60, Oct. 1977. 
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tmry, the argument presented makes a stronger case than ever for under -
standing, and making explicit, the symbiotic relationships between theory 
and method. And from this point let us begin our inquiry. 
Why Not Behavioralism? 
There is a preliminary question which must be asked: how do we 
know anything? The behavioralist believes that for all political activity, 
such as political thinking, there are certain indicators, grounded in 
objective measures, which can be used to describe political phenomena. 
As such, empirical methods rely on theories of correspondence because 
they rely on frequencies, rather than idiosyncrasies. 8 Because politics, 
in terms of individual activity or insight, is not measurable, it is assumed 
that the more comfortable insights afforded by aggregate or survey data 
tell us more about the political world in which we live. Political thinking 
and political philosophy, become tangential to political inquiry. "On 
the one hand, for decades political theo1y failed to fertilize the other 
subfields of the discipline with more empirical-instructional or policy 
concerns," writes Heinz Eulau, 
on the other hand, political theory, as history of political doctrines, 
become a rather scholastic enterprise unrelated to experiences in the 
real world of politics. As an even more immediate result, especially 
germane in this connection , those trained in political theory were 
altogether inoapaciitated for having what I can only describe as a 
feel for the methodologial needs and empirical dilemmas of political 
science.0 
One feels rthat although Eulau's criticism appears to be reasonable his 
solution to the problem might be worse than the original disease. He is 
saying that political thought should be correlative to empirical investi-
gation. 
But, how does one create an emtiricism which does not have some 
philosophical ground first? Jung argues that phenomenology can resolve 
this methodological problem. "Phenomenology is a radical empiricism," 
To be rightly called radical, an empilicism must meet two require-
ments. First, ,the r:adicality of an empirical philosophy demands a 
self-examination and self-clarification of its own theorizing activity . 
s Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971), especially Ch. 3. 
9 James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: 
The Free Press, 1967), p. 40. 
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To be radical, then, phenomenology must attempt to question its 
own presuppositions. Second, to be mdical, an empirical philosophy 
should include no more or less than is directly experienced. There-
fore radical empiricism recognizes the dependence of reflection on 
directly lived experience , that is to say, it accepts ,the idea that re-
flection is founded upon lived experience. What is experiential is 
the primary material for later conceptual activity. 10 
For this reason, phenomenology requires the asking of the primary ques-
tion, how we know, before the second question of what method should 
we use? 
P.henomenologists argue that we know 'things' through an inter-
subjective mood which looks, primarily, at the way in which we exist. 
For example, we all appreciate trees as a common experience. In other 
words, the way in which we know is innate in the way we exist. Phenom-
enology emphasizes that the answer to the research question is second-
ary to -the foundation upon which we base our methodology. The answer 
the researcher gives to how he wants to approach a study is not only 
affected, but dominated by methodology; in behavioral literature this 
process is ex nihilo, in phenomenology it should be essential and explicit. 
Simply, the behavioral research agenda demands a question which 
can be answered in terms of "a" scientific method, which emphasizes 
not methodization, but standardization.11 If a question can be posed 
without possibility of falsifying the null hypothesis then it is meaningless. 
Behavioral methods must limit themselves to objective-knowing analysis, 
con-espondence theory , and therefore the total subjectivity of the individ-
ual can tell one nothing. In behavioral terms a case of one, n of one, is 
never empirically significant. In addition there are chamoteristics, such 
as aesthetic, polemic and political elements, which are not statistically 
measurable and cannot be put in null hypothesis format. These character-
istics are abstract and although some behavioralists 12 argue that they 
should be accounted for, this accountability oan only be derived in 
terms of numeric representations. 
These numeric symbols are characterized as "indicators" by modern 
social science. The recognition of indicators, such '8.S V1ariables, x, y, and 
10 Hwa Yol Jung, "The Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology": p. 
543. 
11 See Justus Buchler , Tfie Concept of Method, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961) , p. 18. See also: Larry D. Spence, The Politics of Social Knowledge 
( University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1978), Ch. 5. 
12 e.g., Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 
1966), Ch. 8. 
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z inferring power, is not empirical or scientific, but rather a subjective 
leap of faith by the researcher. They preach that abstractions cannot be 
measured, yet spend most of their energy developing "indicators" which 
are supposed to desc1ibe abstractions. Rath.er than working within the 
limits of the behavioral paradigm many scientific researchers go to ab-
surd lengths to prove the univer sal applicability of their methodology/ 
th eory; e.g., measuring existential frustration. 18 
Behavioral theories rely on representation: i.e., trying to relate indi-
vidual statistics as representations to language. Essentially behavioral 
theories create models ( or frameworks) and they are th en compared 
with events. Through this "deductive" process events are not described, 
ra:ther they are ascribed characteristics. For example, functionalism 
ascribes "functions" to activiti.es.14 Language is the first form of empiri-
cism as heremen eutics, because it expresses the humanly perceived dia-
logue. Thus, we understand that apples fall before we understand New-
ton's theories of gravity. In ,this sense scientific inquiry when properly 
conducted is phenomenological, only it is not consciously so. Perhaps , 
thart: is why phenomenology appears to measure , in the sense of patt ern, 
human activity more closely. 
The FaUacies Of Temporality And Homogeniety: 
The application of behavior ,al theories falls into difficulties on two 
crucial issues: temporality and homogeniety. The fallacy of temporality 
is the assumption in behavior al literature that observations can be sep-
arated from time, and therefore, oan be examined objectively. "All politi-
cal systems can be compared in terms of the relationship between func-
tions and structures. That is, in a particular political sys.tern at a partic-
ular interval of time, there is a given probability that function A will be 
performed by structure X." 15 This Inight also be referred to as the god-
like falla,cy ( sub specie aeternitatis), because th e Greeks saw their gods 
as atemporal, that infinity was redundant, and ,all things were fixed in a 
single dimension. There was no need to have th ese "human" attributes 
affixed to the gods if one could see (understand) all time and all space. 
In this sens·e, Almond and Bowell 1are predicting correlations and not 
predicting events. Fortunately, the Greeks used this conscious myth 
13 Existential, by definition, is not sensual or measurable. Yet, for example, Bert 
C. Richmond and Linwood Tisdel, "Existentia l Frustration of Graduate and Under-
graduate Students," (Journal of Human Relations, 4th Quarter, 1971), completely 
ignore s this as a problem. 
14 F. S. C. Narthrop, Logic of the Sciences and Human ities ( New York: Mac-
Millan Company, 1948 ), Ch. 16. 
15 Gabriel Almond and C. Bingham Powell, Comparativ e Politics: A Develop-
mental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 30-31. 
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structure as only an exemplar of correct action. The myth assumed that 
the individual would react and not merely accept its assumptions. Un-
fortunately for modern social science, behavioralism views this as an 
objective knowledge of reality. The problem with this type of analysis 
is the assumption of the ".fixedness" of man. lit is not that those of the 
behavioral persuasion want to avoid time, but they realize that the form 
of the scientific enterprise requires theor etical stat ements to be "time-
less." The Greeks , especi-ally Plato, thought that man was continually 
in motion and ,a measure of man 's political activity had to be in terms 
of time .16 Behavioral research in this area must ignore the tempoI1al 
element because they realize that it is the cost of using "maithematics," 
which is by ,definition beyond time. 
Even the bard sciences recogniz e that there are inherent limitations 
in their research becaus e of time-less analysis. The dassic example of 
this is Heisenberg 's uncertainty principl e in physics. ( Heisenberg argued 
tha t if one knows the point occupied by an object one cannot know its 
speed (:time) and if one knows the speed (time) of ,the object its point 
cannot b e determined.) This has a limited, but interesting , applicability 
to the social sciences in ,that ithe uncertainty problem revolves around 
human inference. May Broadbeck points out : "If an unbiased coin is 
tossed a large number of times , then the frequency with which heads 
will tum up is 50 per cent . This says something about the class of all 
tosses of a coin, though it says nothing about what will happen in any 
particular toss." 17 This is the same problem which Heisenberg faces: 
series of events tell us little about individual events. Nomothetic data 
cannot be made relevant to ideographic issues. 
The apology for this objection has been that sociial scientists only 
deal with relational statistics and inference. This ignores the intrinsic 
relationship between theory and methodology which appears to be criti-
cal.18 If one uses a th eory which presupp oses a causal relationship ( like 
structural-functional analysis), no matter the methodology, a causal con-
clusion is entailed. 19 By using implied causal conclusions there is an 
1 6 cf. J. G. A. Pocock's chapt er "On the Non-Revolutionary Ch aracter of Para-
digms: A Self-Critic ism" in Politics, Langiiage and Time (N ew York: Athene um, 
1973). 
17 May Brodb eck, "Exp lan ation and Imperfe ct Knowl edge" in Brodbeck ( ed .) , 
Readings in the Phiwsophy of Social Sciences ( New York: Mac Millan , 1968 ), p. 337 . 
JS Abrah am Kapl an, Condu ct, pp. 322-325. 
l O Note: The re have bee n dozens of attempts to develop causal theories in th e 
social sciences. One does not h ave to go to Hum e's fundamental critiqu e of causal 
analysis to see the absurdity of some of this work. Th e Blalock-Simon causa l anal ysis 
has been one of the most widely used causal methods , esp ecially in electora l analyses 
and congressional behavi or. As H ugh Forb es and E dwa rd Tuft e point out in th eir 
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elementary distortion of the nature and the purpose of methodology 
and its relationship to theory. Group theories are constant victims of 
this kind of thinking for when once one posits the group, it is almost im-
possible to allow for individual freedom or action.20 
To understand the philosophical implications of the distinction be-
tween time and timelessness the difference between ontology and the 
ontic level is fundamental. Onticity is the foundation of the positivist 
argument and has been used as the basis of many other politioal philoso-
phies; Descartes, Leibnitz and Comte are just a few. Onticity is a belief 
in oertain fixed relationships and is what Michael Polanyi criticizes as 
ignorance of the "tacit dimension." He recognizes that there are more 
than mere cognitive assumptions which shape how we assign meaning 
(method) to the world. Changes for natuml scientists have "been ac-
compani ed throughout the centuries by the belief that they offered a 
deeper understanding of reality. This test£ies to a belief in the reality 
of scientific value." 
Only by holding this belief can the scientist direct bis inquiries 
toward tasks of promising scientific value. And only in this convic-
tion oan be inaugurate novel standards with univers,al intent. He 
-can then also teach his students to respect cuITent values and en-
courage them perhaps one day to deepen these values in light of 
their own insights .21 
But he goes on to argue that these tacit chang es are elicited by a mass of 
unknowable data. Insights, new dimensions , come from this unknowable 
mass because all conscious knowledge is grounded in it. However , the 
belief in a reality is onticity. So for the natural scientist, and the analogy 
seems to hold for the social scientist, facts can be separated from the 
human experience-this being universal intent. This is onticity: the 
foundation of each event in a single milieu. 
Understanding the ontological foundations, the source , of a situation 
is what is essential in social science analysis. The first step in viewing this 
December , 1968 American Political Science Review article "A Note of Caution on 
Causal Modeling," Blalock-Simon causal analysis must make the initial assumption 
of a one-way relationship. Unfortunately, no one has demonstrated the existence of 
any one way relationships in political science. 
20 An excellent example of how this problem has been handled previously is 
Richard Taylor's ("Arthur F. Bentley's Political Science," Western Political Quarterly, 
V, June, 1952, p. 219) critique of Robert Maclver for misunderstanding Bentley. 
The misunderstanding revolves around both author's preconceptions of cause and 
detenninism. 
21 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimeruion ( Gard en City, New York: Doubleday 
Company, 1967), p. 69. 
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process comes from an understanding of Heidegger's essence; the realiza-
tion that being is the dialexis of thought and action. When this process 
can be elaborated upon , a foundation for social scientific analysis can be 
established . This grund or foundation is the first step before any analysis, 
and by making it explicit the research itself should be more meaningful. 
All actions have reason and this reason allows an explanation or justifica-
tion of those actions. 
It is important to point out that behavioral methodology frustrates 
any attempt to have an accurate analysis of a political phenomena. When 
one takes the objective "step back ," 22 the behavioralist assumes that the 
researcher is looking at the same phenomena as he was when he was 
"in it." Actually, the researcher changes the phenomena to his ontological 
conceptions ( and in some cases political biases ( cf. Hugh Stretton: op. 
cit.). It appears that behavioralism, given its avoidance of ontological 
status, must destroy any meaningful notion of original human action; 
that is freedom is eliminated as a motivational force. 
The other major fallacy inherent in behavioral literature is the fallacy 
of homogeneity. Basically, the behavioralist must make assumptions 
about men, as a generic concept; as opposed to man. This presupposes 
determinism. Kenneth Arrow points out that the behavioralist has to 
make this assumption because he presupposes determinants ( people 
know what they want) and commensurability ( mores act ,as grounds). 
Thus, there can be only one motive for acting ( one dependent variable) 
and this has been one of the most criticized and falsified assumptions of 
elementristic psychology. 23 For this reason, the impoitance of the notions 
of mean, median and mode in behavioral work become evident. In effect, 
all descriptions in behavioralist tracts are based on these three concepts. 24 
They are theoretical assumptions which allow behavioral research to 
create "man" as a manageable concept by generalizing about the majority 
of men in specific circumstances. Any anomalies, behavior contrary to 
the average, are interpreted as abnormal. 
Thomas Szasz has criticized the entire field of psychiatry for making 
these kinds of assumptions which, in the psychiatric case, allow the 
22 An analysis of this problem can be found in John 0. Wisdom, "Scientific 
Theory: Empirical Content, Embedded Ontology, and Weltanschauung," Philosophy 
and Phenome nological Research, XXXIII ( September, 1972). 
23 cf. Kenneth AJ.'1:ow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963 ) . 
24 Allen Barton discusses the idea of "property space" as a way of developing 
generic constructs necessary to social science. Implicit in his discussion is that these 
generic notions are developed by looking at average (mean), median and mode. 
Delbert Miller (ed.), Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement ( New 
York: David McKay Company, 1970), pp. 127-134. 
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making of medical judgments to create political-ethical distinctions. He 
argues that the concept of average, no1mal, sets up ethical norms from 
which to judge other men.25 In the same vein, zealous "attention to their 
scientific status has led political scientists to a kind of public service" 
which inevitably supports present institutions. A. R. Louch expands on 
the problem in political science using Wildavsky and Pols by, Presidential 
Elections: 
We are allowed to talk about 'real' politics , the maneuverings designed 
to achieve concrete political aims, but we are barred from thinking 
of the party system as havin g point of justification as a vehicle for 
bringing to the electorate divergent political opinions. Here it is not 
statistics that seduce the authors into believing that they have ad-
dressed themselves to the real questions of politics, but something 
equally, if not more naive, that ideas and issues are somehow not as 
real as 'power' and machinations designed to seize or secure it But 
the object of the political scientists as pollster and as power analyst 
is the same, to substitute facts for values . . . In a similar way, the 
definition of a political institution, in terms of power and the 
strategies designed to achieve it, uses a purposive and thus an 
evaluative conception of government. Political scientists claim to tell 
us what the role of an institution is, and not what it ought to be. But 
to speak of a role at all, is to speak of an end to be achieved. We 
are led to endorse a certain and spectacularly limited view of the 
purpose of government in confining our attention to what is in some 
not too clear sense the tangible element in the political process .26 
If it is the pmpose of the political scientist to substitute facts for values, 
then it is the behavioral perspective which prejudice social scientific 
insights in favor of homogeneity . 
Phenomenology is a radicall y individual methodology. It uses the 
ontological perceptions of the "social actor " to shape analyses. In so 
doing, the phenomenologist develops, not subjective ( for they do not 
come from him), but inter-subjective categories through which social 
phenomena can be observed. Thus, phenomenological analysis emphasizes 
the understanding of thought and action within its own context. In this 
way the phenomenologist avoids the problem of temporality , for all 
25 Thomas Szasz, "The Sane Slave," American Journal of Psychotherapy, XXV 
( April, 1971), 228. For a detailed discussion of his thesis as it related to the 
political realm see Ideology and Insanity (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
Company, 1970). 
26 A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), 
pp. 184-185. 
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observations are understood in their own "time." And, the issue of homo-
geneity also is reconciled within a phenomenological method , because all 
social instances are radically individual. 
It is important to emphasize that no study can use the phenomeno-
logical method. Methodology must change with circumstances and the 
scope of inquiry . This has been a major error of behavioral literature . 
There are many phenomenolo gies and a pa1ticular form of phenomenol -
ogy cannot be cannonized. As Stephen Strasser has written: 
It is easy to see what the consequences of such an approach [ a spe-
cific phenomenology] would be. A Husserlian scholasticism would 
then arise, a scholasticism in the bad sense of the term. Speaking 
more or less in the spirit of Wilhelm Wundt , we could characterize 
it as follows. Such a scholasticism would desire to solve the most 
divergent problems by means of a unifo1m set of a priori accepted 
concepts; on the other hand, it would attach so much importance to 
traditional te1ms and concepts that it would not even question the 
basis for those terms and concepts. It is obvious that such an attitude 
would be in flagrant conflict with the spirit of Edmund Husserl. 27 
This is similar to distinctions made betwe en statistics , for there are 
certain 'b est" methods for analyzing data sets; content analysis , factor 
analysis, regression, correlation or even simple percentage tables. 
Two things are being said here. First , phenomenology , as a meth-
odology, must be modified for the types of analyses for which it is in-
tended. Phenomenology , as such, is a method because it attempts to 
explain inconsistenci es; that is, it moves from greater to lesser ambiguity. 
Because it is a methodology , phenomenology requires-like behavioral-
ism-a choice of a theory. Many phenomenologists are guilty of an 
implicit use of theory because it appears to end anger their project: an 
escape from behavioralism. In any case, theory, ( an epistemic construct) 
must be chosen for its parsimony with the method . Since all theory at-
tempts to be holistic, even though some th eorists would deny this , the 
major question is how discrin1inating is it; i.e., what can it account for? 
Phenomenology opens epistemological horizons by presenting the "fore-
ground" and the 'background " of language, that is, direct experience 
and what one believes about that direct experience . C. T. Jones uses this 
fram e of analysis to demonstrate the limitations of empirical methods. 28 
27 Stephen Strasser, The Idea of Dialogal Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duqu esne 
University Press, 1969). 
28 W . T. Jones, The Science and the Humanities (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), p. 35. 
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Only one of these dimensions, (foreground) and sometimes only part of 
that , is useful from an empirical persp ective . 
Typ es of Phenomenology : 
Phenomenology has a varied history with many contributors , in-
cluding such philosophers as Sartre, Schleiermacher Merleau-Ponty, and 
Teilh ard de Chardin. Phenomenology can be viewed in terms of three 
distinct schools. The first, and most famous, is existential ph enomenology. 
It attempts to understand man's existence and the epistemological ques-
tions surrounding that existence. 29 The second school is theistic phenom -
enology which attempts to answer eschatological questions. 30 The last 
movement in phenomenology and the one in which we are most inter-
ested, will be called proceptive phenomeno logy. This is being used in 
Justus Buchler's sense of "proception" as the "moving union of seeking 
and receiving, of forward propulsion , and patient absorption." 31 Pro-
ceptive phenomenology is that school which is interested in looking at 
human activity in terms of "being" human. A development of dialogal 
phenomenology must use four major figures in proceptive phenomenol-
ogy: Edmund Musserl, Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur , and Stephen 
Strasser. 
Husserl is generally considered the father of phenomenology. He was 
attempting to go beyond the psychologism of the early twentieth century 
and develop a mathematical method beyond objectified consciousness. To 
his mind, the intention of the individual could be as analytically important 
as his denotative state. For example, take the case of the political 
scientist who argues that culture determines fom1s of governments. As-
sun1ing the nominal term culture can be empirically defined through 
indicators , he proceeds to analyze political institutions through cultural 
variability . Roy Warner has recently pointed out that culture is a 
deluding concept which is only "manufactured" in the western mind .82 
The phenomenologist would never accept culture as a tool of analyses 
because it is a loaded conceptual term and not a common place ( brack-
eted) or essence. 
For Husserl the reality of an object, its existence, is not as in1portant 
as the meaning of that object. His intentional analyses always become 
29 This includes Jean Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness), Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (Humanism and Terror), and John Wild (Existence and the World of Free-
dom) . 
so e.g. Rudolph Otto ( The Idea of the Holy): Friedrich Schleiermacher ( The 
Christian Faith); Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (The Divine Milieu). 
Sl Justus Buchler, Toward a Theory of Human Judgment (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1953), p. 4. 
32 Roy1 Wagner, The Invention of Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975 J. 
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constitutive analysis, that is, analysis which does not indicate how 
meaning is found in the primary world of experiences, but which seek 
to explain how the meaning of things is primordially constituted in and 
through consciousness. Thus , the ultimate reahty for Husserl is man's 
existence. All reality is based on man's consciousness which interprets 
reality and gives it meaning. This is not the harsh ontic concept of 
existence found in Descartes (Je pense, done je suis), but rather one which 
places man , not as the center, but as the interpreter of the universe. This 
idea of interpretation can be explained in terms of the homely philosoph-
ical saw of the tr ee falling in the forest; does it make a sound? Husserl 
would argue that sound is a human interpretation, and the primordial 
concept of sound makes no sense without human being. Existence for the 
phenomenologist has only one and a very particular meaning . "It [ exist-
ence] serves not to express that something actually belongs to the realm 
of existing realities , but to indicate that mode of being which is proper 
to man and precisely constitutes him a human being. In other words, 
only man exists." 88 
Phenomenology was not a correspondence theory for Husserl; that is 
a theory based on correlations. Rather , it was an attempt to bypass the 
perceptual problems involved in description. It is in description that 
social scientists run into difficulty, because all description starts with a 
normative notion of being. The functionalist, for example, attempts to fix 
being by defining it in a specific way and calhng it fact. 84 Con-commitant 
with this, being ( as an assumption) must be assumed to be able to take 
itself out of being to describe being. Behavioral notions of self appear 
to be created on a multitude of ad hominem arguments. In dealing with 
this problem in history, psychology and biology , Berger and Luckman 
describe the epistemological problems: 
The logical structure of this trouble is basically the same in all cases: 
How can I be sure, say, of my sociological analysis of American mid-
dle-class mores in view of the fact that the categories I use for this 
analysis are conditioned by historically relative forms of thought, 
that I myself and everything I think is determined by my genes and 
by my ingrown hostility to my fellowmen, and that , to cap it all, I 
am myself a member of the American middle class?85 
33 Joseph Kockelmans, Phenomenology and the Physical Sciences (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1966), p . 51. 
34 Almond and Powell, Comparative, pp. 21-22 or Deutsch, Nerves, Ch. 6. 
85 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction af Reality 
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 13. 
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Joseph Kockelmans attempts an answer to this query: 
The greatest difficulty encountered in this task lies in the fact that 
demonstrations are largely useless because being is not something 
'~that can be demonstrated." For being cannot be considered from a 
standpoint lying outside being itself; moreover, every question re-
garding ,being necessarily presupposes that one absolutely exclude 
any radical distinction between the object investigated ,and the being 
which investigaites. For this reason an adequate study of the prob-
lem of being demands a method of its own. As we have seen, this 
method is supplied by phenomenology. 86 
Phenomenology allows relief from the constraints of "proof' for the so-
clal scientist in dealing with those 1areas in which he is involved. In a 
sense this exaoerbates ithis problem because it is questionable whether 
any social phenomena lie outside this rurea. 
An essence, then, is a common human concept which allows us to 
make theoretical statements about the realities around us . . Using the 
concept of justice, man develops law, government and other political 
'ideas.' The essence acts as foundation of an invented pyramid on which 
are developed the theoretical relationship through which we understand 
the world. The problem with Husserl comes from his going beyond phe-
nomenology 37 to idealistic transcendental phenomenology. 38 Husserl 
later went beyond simple understanding of essence to the linking of all 
essences to form the composite of human experiences. All things were 
transcendent in their nature and, much like !{;ant's Ding an sich (thing 
in itself), Husserl developed an insight into the interrelationships of 
man. Because of this both he iand the phenomenological movement came 
under scathing criticism. The critique of this kind of idealism was im-
minent in terms of its prosupposition of a nature of man; which was 
e:mctly what using phenomenological analysis as a method was designed 
to avoid . Husserl had changed phenomenology from a method to a 
theory. 
There were many attempts to deal with his dilemma. The theistic 
idealis ,ts, like Ernst Cassirer 39 and Teilhard de Chardin, 40 attempted to 
36 Kockelmans, Phenomenology of Physical, p. 50. 
87 Edmund Husserl , Ideas ( London: Collier, 1969) . 
38 Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of European Philosophy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965). 
39 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Form ( New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1953), 3 VOLS. 
40 Telhard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu ( New York: Harper Torch, 1960). 
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use Husserl's idealistic tmnscendentalism to justify a belief in the "other." 
This existential justification of God tended to distort and lay the ground-
work for the major criticisms of phenomenology. It was simply accused 
of being a moralistic justifisation for Christianity. The historilal realists 
( existential phenomenologists) like Jose Ortega Y Gasset 41 and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, 42 used existential exegeses to deal with the Husserlian 
problem of idealism. But both wound up with the very practical prob-
lem of what is essence and how can it be used. From this perspective, 
Paul Ricoeur and Martin Heidegg er appear to collectively lay the ground-
work for solving Husserl's idealism-transcendentalism dilemma. Both 
approached the probl em of essence in terms of language. The study of 
hermeneutics became the key to the phenomenological essence.43 Both 
Heidegger and Ricoeur see phenomenology as a method. 44 However, 
Heidegger views it as a semantic method while Ricoeur understands it 
in terms of semiotics. Both are similar in that they view the structure of 
language analy.tically. Ricoeur believes th•at phenomenology is articulated 
through a variety of methods and the best scientific or objectivist in-
quiries conceal "good implicit phenomenology." 45 
Both Ricoeur and Heidegger value language, but they see language 
manifesting itself in different ways. For Ricoem, the symbolism of lan-
guage gives it meaning and for Heidegger it is the making (doing) of 
language. It is not so much that one disagrees with the other but rather 
that they approach the task from different roads. It oan be argued that 
they are roads to the same place, and that both Ricoeur and Heidegger 
would agree with J. L. Mehta's insight as to the goal. 
The horizons of language and culture, of period and history, of tiiadi-
tion and race both enable thinking and limit and divide it. And yet 
there is such a thing as a fusion of horizons in which the past and 
the present meet, in which what is alien is appropriated and other-
ness is overcome, though only as a process and a task that never 
41 Jose Ortega Y Gasset, History as a System (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1961). 
42 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
Or more directly cf. Merleau-Ponty's preface to The Phenomenology of Perception 
(Atlantic-High.lands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962), pp. VLL-XXL. 
43 cf. Don Ihd e, Hermeneutic Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1971), p. 4. 
44 Ibid., pp. 95-97 and Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 111-136. 
45 U1de, Hermeneutic, p. 6. For primary source material by Ricoeur see: The 
Symbolism af Evil ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) , Stuart and Bien, Political and 
Social Essays by Paul Ricoeur (Atliens, Ohio University Press, 1974) and especially 
"The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," Social Research 
(38, 1971). 
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comes to an end. Such fusion, however, requires labor of the con-
cept to be raised to a philosophioal level and indeed constitutes the 
very care of the philosophical consciousness . . . .46 
Thus, it is in the attempt to fuse humian experience into an understand-
able ground that the phenomenologists oome together. 
This is a problem which has worried those who study political 
thought and activity for centuries: How does one build a method which 
will at least attempt the fusion of experience? There is a problem of 
viewing political thinkers as isolated, idiosyncratic "events." Even with 
minor exceptions to this rule, like Lenin, political scientists are still 
forced to segregate the body of the theorist's works from his activity. 
Perhaps thinkers would be simply interesting to study in their own right, 
but this ,assumes that their insights have no relevance to other phe-
nomena. This is an ,important point because we are assuming just the 
opposite; that thinkers are "indicators' of the phen~mena of being. In 
a real sense they are as important as any other political "variable." As 
Robert Heineman has pointed out, this is a major lacuna in political 
science: 
In theory interpretation the tendency is clearly to regard the words 
of the theorist in and of themselves as objects of analysis when in 
fact they are projections of an existential being and are essentially 
clues to his meaning . . . In their reillcation of words, students of 
political thought have e:xracerbated the other-I gulf thait Lang sees 
as the primary obstacle to understanding between persons. 47 
How do we cope with this problem , as those who study political 
thought? Both Ricoeur and Heidegger have given clues to answers. 
Stephen Strasser integrates them in his book The Idea of Dialogal Phe-
nomenology in a way useful to the social scientist. Where Heidegger and 
Ricoeur left the social scientist with teasing tastes of what phenomenol-
ogy affords, Strasser gives insights which can be digested and used for 
social scientific investigation. 
46 J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin H~idegger ( New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), p. XI. For primary source material: 
An Introduction to Metaphysics (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961) 
The Essence of Reasons (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) 
Existence and Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949) 
Nietzsche I &II ( Verlag Gunther Neske Pfullinger, 1961) 
47 Robert A. Heineman , "Political Thought and the Signification of Existential 
Being," unpublished manuscript presented at the Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion Convention, Chicago, May 3, 1973, p. 2. 
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Strasser begins with Husserl's insight that our perceptions are not 
necessarily reality. From this Strasser argues that "if we really desire 
to proceed in a truly phenomenological-descriptive way, we must hold 
fast just as much to the plurality and pluriformity of worlds as to the 
unicity of the world." 48 Indeed, it is only intercourse with other human 
beings which presents this plurality and pluriformity. And, only in so 
doing can one surpass the hori.zon, the "unsurpassable" nature, pre--
sented by the world. This "open" horizon makes the empiricist just as 
vaiid a contributor in that he provides a facet of this plurality. There-
fore, Science is understood as an epistemological exercise rather than 
an objective one. As such, both phenomenology and soience are empirical 
eXJercises because they organize data. The phenomenologist begins from 
that which is perceived "whether it be a thing, ,a social relationship, 
or a phenomenon in consciousness." By using the perception, the initial 
essence, he tries to discover the "rule structure" which the matter in 
question prescribes to the knower. In other words, by stru:iting with the 
ontological existenz the phenomenologist can see how the individual 
places it in the formal world which he perceives. It is through organi:m-
tion that we can understand the individual existence . By using this as a 
method the phenomenologist lets himself be ruled, as by a norm, by what 
he perceives, by what he imagines or what he thinks . In this intuitive, 
empathetic immersion comes insight. Thus, the researcher must 'prag-
matically' use the essence and the structure built around the essence to 
understand the meaning of the experience. 49 
But is is the experience which is mos,t important. In the first instance 
the phenomenologist must 'perceive' and 'describe' as the individual in-
sight of concrete and individual reality. 
Such a perception of reality can easily be changed into an intuition 
of the nature of the reality in question. What is "perceived" is, 
for example, a sound I hear or a thing I see. In the second instance 
the object of intuition is the essence of "sound" in general or the 
eidos of the "spatially extended thing" in general. It is in this sense 
that Husserl says: "Immediate seeing, not merely the sensory see-
ing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial data of con-
sciousnss of any kind whatsover, is the ultimate source of justifica-
·tion for all rational assertions. 50 
48 Strasser, Dialogal, p. 49. Another view of this issue is presented by Jose 
Ortega Y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), Ch. 1. 
49 Jbid., pp. 76-77. 
50 lbid., p. 6. 
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In a sense we must receive the initial input of the reverberations of that 
input to understand it in context. For example, the astronomer knows that 
light moves at specific speeds. When he says that he is looking at a star 
which is 8 million light years away, he expects us to realize that what 
he is looking at is a star which existed in the observed circumstance 8 
million years ago. It is this contextual understanding which phenomeno-
logy hopes to establish. In order to attain this context for human exper-
ience we must avoid logically causal assumptions; simply because causal-
ity is not a conscious, human action . Rath er, it is something attributed to 
human activity. 
Phenomenology is an exercise in the description of commonly human 
perceptions. It is in the individual's description of circumstance from 
which we learn. What Strasser argues, and what makes him distinct 
from other phenomenologists, is that to enter into the "other's" space we 
must have a dialogue with him. It is in the dialectical relationship with 
other human beings in which we learn things; and the ambiguity of this 
relationship substantiates those things. "Thus we see that the dialectic 
which flows from this most original, most general and necessary ontologi-
cal situation ," writes Strasser 
is not an epistemological thought experiment. It is not an arbitrary 
change of attitude, not an act which I can, at will, accomplish. It 
has its roots in the things which I had to expe1ience, perceive and 
undergo in order to become the one who at present I am. The dia-
logal dialectic, then , arises where freedom and necessity coincide for 
me; it is a philosophical reflection upon my destiny. 51 
It is in the dialogue that phenomenology can have a grasp of 
ontoloby, for which all methodologists have been searching. It is a human 
ontology determined only by th e possibility of human experience. 
As applied, dialogal phenomenology constitutes the world as it arises 
between myself and the political actor in the context of our "social and 
historical" life. Activity and though make no sense as isolated individual 
acts. "The task of dialogal phenomenology will be to describe how a 
world arises for us in the dialogue between me •and the other," 
It will also examine the turning points of this dialogue and the cor-
responding changes of worlds. It will not neglect the drama of 
human existence . Dialo gal phenomenology can fulfill this task be -
cause it accepts the other as the most original datum of experience 
51 Ibid., p. 21. 
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and draws from it the most important conclusion: it presents itself 
as a philosophy of finiteness.52 
To view this dialogue the primary step is to establish a "ground" or 
essence. One could suggest the use of the concepts of praxis, alienation, 
freedom and justice as essences. But how could these be used? 
Around each "thing" there are consequences-contexts. As Strasser 
points out: 
around the core of actual data there are formed, as it were, con-
centric centers of possible new explorations which are known only 
as to their general style. For example, I see a piece of furniture 
fairly well, but I am unable to discern the particular patterns in the 
grain of the wood. I know that I must get closer to that object to 
see the pattern and that, if I wish to see the other side, I must go 
around that piece of furniture and look again. The term "must" each 
time indicates a step forward beyond the actual experience. It is this 
kind of "concentric circles" of possible anticipating intentions re-
lated to the same object that Husserl calls an "inner horizon." 53 
Each experience, much like dropping a pebble into a lake, has concentric 
circles of reaction around it. The original perception is what the phe-
nomenologist calls noesis and the concentric circles are what he calls 
noema. The difference becomes clear in the following example "of seeing 
a house" from Joseph Kockelmans: 
In this particular act of perception of noesis this house effectively 
manifests itself always in this particular profile when this particular 
standpoint is assumed; but, nonetheless, each concrete act intends 
more than this particular profile and aims at the home as a whole. 
This intended total meaning in every particular act of perception of 
the house, precisely insofar as it manifests itself in this act, is 
called noema. This noema explains why every individual act of per-
ceptions refers to other, possible perceptions of this same house. 
But how do we apply the dialogal method? 54 
N oema or Essence: 
The answer to the above questions must first devolve into asking 
what essences will be used and why? The use of essences is called 
eidetics or the tracing of the perception from the cogito to the world. 
52 Ibid., p. 22. 
53 Ibid., p. 28. 
54 Kochelmans, Phenomenology, p. 43. 
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In other words, the source of the essence is its development or activity. 
Psychiatrist Abraham Winkler aptly stated the problem of using essences 
in his critique of applied phenomenology: 
The eidetic grasp of reality or of the essence of phenomena is 
strictly private. Therefore, the phenomenologist who does the grasp-
ing or intuiting should remain silent because there is no way to 
convey to anyone else the operations by which he arrives at these 
insights or even to describe the insights themselves. I am sure that 
were the phenomenologists of Husserl's school confronted with this 
semantic problem, they would have to admit that the moment they 
make a statement about their direct experience of phenomena, the 
experience becomes distorted thereby. Some reduction has already 
occurred . and reduction is a terrible word. And so they would be 
forced to conclude, I think, that the best thing to do is to contemplate 
phenomena and remain silent.116 
But Professor Winkler addresses the 1ight problem with the wrong 
weap on. The essence is not a semantic difference or problem, because 
it is not the structure, but the meaning of language, which is important. 
It is a problem in communication through language and not in language. 
The distinction is critical. The consh·uction of grammatical rules does not 
present difficulties, but rather the willingness to accept the incompre-
hensibility of language which becomes manifest. Empiricists talk about 
concepts rather than with concepts. Phenomenologists recognize that 
when you talk about words out of context you destroy their meaning. 
Simply, in a word expressing a concept, or in a series of words forming 
a phrase of a sentence, there is more than definition; there is idea. 
Words are metaphors. There is no pure description for the phe-
nomenologist. 58 Therefore, an essence is simply a metaphor for a common 
human idea. An idea is not known through language but understood 
through being. Being in this sense is the noema of the person. Perhaps 
a parallel example would be beneficial here. All chemists and physicists 
are familiar with Avogadro's number ( 6.024 x 1023 gm/mole) which is 
55 Carlos Cossio, "Phenomenology Of Judgment" in J. Sayers, Introduction to 
Modem Legal Philosophies, p. 85. 
56 cf. Berger and Luckman, The Social Constmction of- Reality ( Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday Company, 1967), pp. 47-51. 
57 Erwin Straus (ed.), Phenomenology: Pure and Applied ( Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1964), p. 187. 
58 Stephen Pepper, World Hypothesis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1966), points out that communication occurs through root metaphors which develop 
through interpretive theories. See Ch. 5. 
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a converting factor from grams to moles. Both of these are measures 
and, much like language, demonstrates meaning only in application. The 
scientists know that Avogadro's number can be carried out to an infinite 
number of decimal places. However, in using it they round it off to three 
places realizing that it is a mathematical relationship, relevant to 
significant numbers, not fact ,that they are measuring. The number 
derived is simply an essence, the most meaningful moment, which can 
never be accurate. In much the same way language is an inaccurate 
expression of understanding. Thus Winkler's critique holds for all 
methods, phenomenological and positivist, because they are intuitive 
agreements on proximate measures. 59 The essence is the empirical 
foundation of "idea" investigation and allows inquiry as epistemologically 
satisfying as positivism. 
The Political Essence: 
Before getting into the meaning and application of essences, it is 
incumbent upon us first to distinguish the basic assumptions of phe-
nomenological and behavioral theories. The distinction is remarkably 
easy to make. The behavioralist founds his assumptions on goal oriented 
behavior; i.e., all activities of man are purposeful. 00 On the other hand 
the phenomenologist grounds his assumptions on the notion of being. 
The behavioralist is externally centered and the phenomenologist is inter-
nally centered. A word of explanation is in order here. The behavioralist, 
because he is goal oriented, believes that man lives and acts to affect 
the world around him. The phenomenologist sees the world as a simple 
extension, a penumbra of the cogito. For him, man exists in terms of 
the development of consciousness. He is conscious in so far as the world 
is seen as a projection of being. Because the human develops the world 
through his own personal development, goal oriented behavior appears 
as a pseudoscientific misperception of the way in which man exists. An 
example of this is the notion of freedom, which has a very limited mean-
ing for the behavioralist, where the phenomenologist can understand 
freedom in a multitude of ways. Therefore, freedom has "to be under-
stood within the intentionality of being in the world." 61 Sadler interprets 
freedom through the idea of play; that is being experimenting with the 
world. It is important to understand the distinction between these two 
59 cf. Joseph Kockelmans, ''Stegmuller on the Relationship Between Theory and 
Experience," Philosophy of Science, XXXIX ( September, 1972), p. 397. 
60 Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo-Politics: A Critical Evaluation of Some 
Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, LIX (March 1965) 
39-40. ' ' 
61 Sadler, Existence, p. 203. 
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pernpectives. In the current conceptions of •analyses behavioralism and 
phenomenology are paradigms and not theories. That is, they do not 
constitute the specific project of a description, but project an interpreta-
tion of the entire "world" in terms of a certain format. 
The phenomenological format requires the development of essences 
which can be called politiral. These political essences describe the space 
in which political activity occurs. Phenomenology attempts to describe 
that space so that activity can be understood. In so doing it points out 
the cultural limitations of one's own space. ( Culture is being used here 
subjectively, not empirically.) Political, again, is the authoritative allo-
cation of meaning. So when we talk of political space, it is the space, 
the dimension, in which definitions of meaning occur. As Sadler points 
out, every culture, and every segment of culture, defines its space or 
dimensionality in a way current to its idyosyncratic perspective. He 
argues that to understand Africans we cannot look at them as nations, 
in the sense political scientists use the word, but more in the concept 
of tribes. 62 This is not to say that the unit "tribe" has not been used 
by social scientists, rather, that the behavioral methodology makes it far 
more easy to deal with nation. The problem of space and value is an 
important one and something to which the social scientist constantly 
fall prey. Values are necessarily included in all cultural research. 68 But, 
phenomenology allows the inclusion of values without the distortion of 
inquiry. The idea of essence is to develop organization not creation. What 
the essence does is allow us to look at data in its most fundamental 
form-language. 
What makes essences political? Simply, it is the interpretation of the 
world which creates that which we hold in common. 64 Essences are 
undefinable in that they depend on human interpretation for meaning. 
Several essences suggest themselves in politics: freedom, justice, action 
( interpenetration of thought and action), alienation. The use of these 
would naturally depend on the theoretical framework employed, but in 
any sense, would be used to organize how these essences were used in a 
specific context. For example, a radical group would be analyzed in terms 
02 Ibid., pp. 262-264. 
63 F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Science and the Humanities, pp. 278-292. 
64 This is argued in many places but perhaps Eldridge Cleaver put it best: Each 
time he gave a talk, Stokely (Carmichael) would cite Alice in Wonderland. "When I 
use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I 
choose it to mean, neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many 
different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "who is to be master, that's all." 
(Eldridge Cleaver, Post-Prison Writings and Speeches (New York: Vintage Books, 
1969), p. 54. 
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of how their thought related to these essences-or other, more meaning-
ful essences. These are methodological and not theoretical statements. 
They represent the foundations of political language, the grammar of 
that language, which then can be used to examine political ideas. 
While phenomenology might appear to take similar ideas out of 
context, it must be remembered that context is "with interweaving or 
content." Thus, in context requires continuity of an entire idea. This is 
what phenomenology tries to achieve, the weaving together of essential 
ideas to form the ground or basis for understanding. When one looks 
at a painting, it is not only the totality, but the color, depth, meaning 
and dimension which is evaluated. The phenomenologist uses ideas to 
achieve a viewpoint, or methodological framework. 
Conclusion: 
Our purpose has been to open empirical methodology and find out 
what makes it empirical. If the last several pages have been at all 
insightful, then it has become evident that empirical methodology does 
not have to be as structured or mathematically dominated as the be-
havioralists would lead us to believe. Phenomenology has been presented 
as an alternative, but in some senses also a supplement. Although I must 
admit to not having firm convictions on either side, it appears that in 
many instances phenomenology can be used to complement empirical 
research. This is, however , a provisional statement and should not be 
construed as advocacy. In a more specific vein, dialogal phenomenology 
has opened new areas of research for the social scientist. The inductive 
emphasis on epistemology and the flexibility of its methodology portent 
exciting possibilities. Examples of these several areas of inquiries follow. 
A singularly fascinating problem in political science has been the 
difficulty in explaining and und erstan ding ideology . Dialogal phenome-
nology opens an entirely new realm of investigation for its allows the 
examination of public attitude and individual writings simultaneously. 
This paves a new level of empirical content in areas that we previously 
trapped in history. For example, it offers the methodology to come to 
grips with such authors as George Mosse, Nazi Culture, Mayer's They 
Thought They Were Free, and Wilhelm Reich's The Mass Psychology 
of Fascism. It allows us to look at voting behavior in terms of the 
dialogue set up between the politician and the voter. This does not deny 
empirica l content, but can truly be a collateral enterprise. This author 
has actually used dialogal phenomenology in conjunction with Marx's 
theories of alienation and consciousness to analyze American Black 
political thought. 
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The possibiliti es are indeed innnite , for this type of method appears 
to open up an entirely new paradigmatic ground work. Certainly this is 
a pretentious statement , but it is an "audacious " enough proposition to 
warrant furth er investigation. Some might argu e that our thesis neces-
sarily disavows sciences and thus robs us of its magic cloak. On the 
contrary, phenom enology does not deny science, because it is vitally con-
cerned with empirical reality. It is also far from any type of mysticism. 611 
What is is, is yet to be demonstrated in political science. 
Our case should not be dismissed because of any qualms about the 
ontology-m ethodology question. It is obvious that this is sacreligious 
in a social science that is so dominated by epistemic questions-both in 
the normative and empirical areas. But if another expostulation is allowed, 
perhaps this is exactly what our greatest problem has been. 
The sciences have retained one characteristic of philosophy: the 
illusion of pure theory. This illusion does not determine the prac-
tice of scientific research but only its self-understanding. And to the 
extent that this self-understanding reacts back upon scientific prac-
tice, it even has its point. 
The glory of ,the sciences is their unswerving application of 
th eir methods without reflecting on knowledge-constitutive in-
terests. From knowing not what they do methodologically, they are 
that much surer of their discipline , that is of methodical progress 
within an unproblematic framework. False consciousness has a pro-
tective function. 66 
This is in a real sense "damning with faint praise" for it is the point 
at which most scientists and philosophers of science have difficulty 
( Heisenberg , Born, Einstein, Kuhn are but a few) . H false consciousness 
is paraplegic in the nahual sciences, then it is catatonic in the social 
sciences. The social sciences can no longer afford to leave this boulder 
unturned. 
This article has no intention of being "the last word." It is more 
likely one of the initial probes into the ontology of social science. The 
feeling has been stirring throughout the discipline that a new cathartic 
is needed, especially after the deflation of post-behavioralism. I am not 
necessarily saying that phenomenology will bring this re-vitalization , 
but I can think of a lot worse places to start . 
65 William A. Luijpen, Phenomenology and Humanism (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1966), pp. 3-7. 
66 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1968), p . 315. 
